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ECOTONE: a transition zone between two adjacent
ecological communities, such as forest and grassland.
It has some of the characteristics of each bordering
community and often contains species not found in the
overlapping communities. An ecotone may exist along
a broad belt or in a small pocket, such as a forest
clearing, where two local communities blend together.
The influence of the two bordering communities on
each other is known as the edge effect. An ecotonal
area often has a higher density of organisms and a
greater number of species than are found in either
flanking community.
This issue of THE ECOTONE is devoted to theNew Carissa Oil Spill which occured nearCoos Bay, Oregon in early 1999. Receiving
international coverage, this environmental tragedy
continued to surprise and dismay us all as it unfolded.
In this issue, we examine the oil spill from several
diverse perspectives. In his article, "Flames of the
New Carissa Illuminate the Environmental Dilemma,"
Gregory Bothun examines the complexities of envi-
ronmental decision-making, which must often choose
among several undesirable options. Peter Walker then
examines the important need for strong maritime rules
to help prevent such disasters in his article, "When the
Beach is Clean, the Hard Work Begins." Ronald
Mitchell, in "Responding to Environmental Acci-
dents," addresses the need for both external regula-
tions on polluters and internal regulations on our own
behavior, which also has a tremendous cumulative
impact on the environment. Finally, Robert Collin
argues that local communities must be incorporated
into the decision-making process as a means of
achieving environmental justice in his article, "The
Role of Coastal Communities in Environmental
Decisions."
Every environmental issue, problem or event
is highly complex, requiring the diverse perspectives
of many different fields to identify, describe, or
solve. We hope this issue of THE ECOTONE begins to
untangle some of the many strands that together
compose the New Carissa tragedy.
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Chronology of the New Carissa Oil Spill
Copyright 1999, Oregon Live
Grounding Feb. 4: The New Carissa runs ers push the New Carissa at least 30 feet to the south,aground near Coos Bay, Oregon; the crew of Punishing winds the next day block helicopter from23 is evacuated the next day. hooking the New Carissa to the tugboat Sea Victory.
Feb. 6: Bill Milwee, a salvage expert on the spill
response command team, says, "We have no fear.
We'll get it out of here."
Feb. 8: The ship begins leaking from two of its five
fuel oil tanks. Crews begin deploying cleanup equip-
ment.
Feb. 10: The command team decides to burn the fuel
oil onboard, but Navy explosives experts fail to ignite
it. Using heavier explosives and napalm the next day,
the Navy team sets the ship ablaze. Hours later, the
stern section splits apart from the bow. For several
days, crews try to reignite the remaining fuel.
Feb. 16: In an onboard inspection, officials discover
130,000 to 150,000 gallons of unburned fuel oil still
on board.
Feb. 17: The tugboat Sea Victory prepares to tow the
bow section to sea and sink it, but high seas foil the
attempt. Officials announce plans to pump fuel oil off
the ship before trying again.
Feb. 19: Pumping is postponed when crews discover
rainwater has flooded the fuel tanks. Once the fuel oil
is pumped ashore, the plan is to tow the bow 248 miles
to sea and sink it in deep water. The next night, chal-
lenged by heavy winds and strong currents, crews
begin pumping thick fuel oil from the ship through 700
feet of 4-inch-diameter hose to tanks on land.
Feb. 21: Stinging hail, gale-force winds and a kinked
hose hamper the off-and-on attempts, but by afternoon,
crews manage to pump 100,000 gallons of fluid from
cargo hold No. 3 to tanks on shore but most of it is
water.
Feb. 22: U.S. Coast Guard and salvage officials aban-
don oil-pumping efforts as overnight winds and break-
Feb. 25: Bouncing in rough seas, the Sea Victory is
unable to hold steady for hooking a towline to the
ship. But conditions have improved enough to enable
a helicopter to fly and for crews to complete most of
the other towing connections.
Feb. 26: A helicopter lifts the towline to the Sea
Victory, and the tug pulls hard for two hours. The
New Carissa's bow appears to pivot slightly seaward.
Feb. 27: The slightest jostle is cause for speculation
and cautious celebration as the broken ship begins
creeping into the sea. It inches forward 35 feet on a
rising tide while the Sea Victory churns with 107 tons
of pulling power.
Feb. 28: The morning tide is the highest yet, and the
Sea Victory drags the New Carissa 35 feet in the
morning and another 25 feet shortly before midnight.
Mar. 1: Buoyed by the high tide the New Carissa
moves over a sandbar and more than 900 feet into the
waves. Officials say a tow of another 400 feet will get
it into water deep enough for its bottom to clear the
beach.
Mar. 2: The New Carissa heads to sea, but jubilation
turns to horror when, at 5:18 p.m. and about 40 miles
out, the towline snaps amid one of the fiercest storms
of the winter. The Sea Victory puts out an alert that
the New Carissa is "freedrifting" on a north northeast
course at 6 mph.
Mar. 3: The New Carissa runs aground near Waldport
about sunrise and begins leaking again.
Mar. 8: The New Carissa dragged off the coast a
second time.
Mar. 12: After defying multiple explosives and artil-
continued on page 10
Flames of the New Carissa Illuminate the Environmental Dilemma
by Gregory Bothun, Professor of Physics, University of Oregon
Few issues polarize society more than environ-mental ones. It seems that everyone has anopinion on the right course of action to take
and, of course, there are as many right courses as there
are opinions. Amidst this plethora of "solutions" time-
critical decisions must be made. This opens the door
to second-guessing and arm-chair policy makers who
insist there is a silver bullet to solve a given environ-
mental problem. Bang, bang, problem solved - if only
they had listened to me.
In the real world, environmental problems are complex
and multi-dimensional. Often times, the "solution"
does more harm than good. For instance, in 1967 the
massive oil tanker Torrey
Canyon struck the rocks of
the Isles of Scilly in the UK
and began spilling its 120,000
tons of crude oil. Similar to
the New Carissa incident, a
decision was made to burn off
the fuel by bombing the
wrecked freighter. But this
decision was made several
days after an extensive oil
spill had already escaped the
breached hull. By then 700
square miles of sea were
covered with oil. Ironically,
more damage was done to the ecosystem by the appli-
cation of detergents designed to disperse the oil than
the actual oil spill itself.
The grounding of the New Carissa and the subsequent
breach of its hull via wave action created an immediate
environmental problem for the Coos Bay ecosystem.
Little time was available for problem analysis and
decisions had to be made. As such, the New Carissa
represents an excellent case study of the response of
policy makers to a random, but catastrophic, environ-
mental occurrence.
Photograph: U.S. Navy uses explosives and napalm
in attempt to burn oil on board.
2/10/99 USCG
On Feb 11, while the Naval expert explosivesteam was applying 350 gallons of Napalm tothe New Carissa fuel tanks, I started off my
Environmental Science class with an open discussion
of the problem and possible solutions.
"Why can't we just pump it out?" was a common
question.
"Why did we allow the ship to reach this condition
where its hull was breached?" was another.
"Why doesn't Oregon have better response team for
this kind of environmental hazard?" said a student
from Galveston, Texas.
"How about helicoptering out
the oil in small barrels"?
wondered another.
Their ideas, while sincere,
reflect the silver bullet ap-
proach to environmental
problem solving. Most of the
students questioned the
necessity of burning the
bunker oil, as the experts at
Coos Bay ultimately decided,
as the best solution. They
were convinced better solutions were possible. Burn-
ing seems like an extreme solution and certainly a
more benign approach is warranted. Besides, burning
has been tried before in similar incidents in the Gulf of
Alaska and the results have been mixed. So is this
really the wisest approach? All of these are proper
questions to ask, but they need to include a dose of
reality and objectivity.
So one by one we went through the list. The risks of
pumping the oil out were great. Approximately 1000
feet of line would have to be laid to shore. The 20 to
30 foot seas greatly elevated the risk of a line rupture
and spilling oil directly on the shoreline. The bunker
oil itself has the viscosity of tar and is therefore not
amenable to being pumped out at a very fast rate.
Lowering the viscosity requires heating the oil. But,
how do you heat oil that is constantly inundated (and
cooled) by sea water?
Why was the ship allowed to remain grounded without
an immediate tow? Well, immediately towed with
what? Several hundred thousand tons of metal buried
in the sand represents an immense inertia that can't be
dislodged by the action of small tugboats bumping into
the hull. The right kind of equipment to deal with this
problem simply wasn't available. But this is not poor
planning. The grounding of the New Carissa was a
highly improbable event. There is not enough money
in the State Budget to foresee all possible random
environmental catastrophes and have an immediately
available response - preparations taxpayers utimately
have to pay for. Environmental accidents are generally
unexpected and can happen quickly. While such
incidents usually generate a torrent of blame, that is
wasted energy. It's the decision making after the event
that is critical.
So what about the idea of removing the fuel in small
helicopter loads? A creative approach to be sure, but
tempered by the reality that 400,000 gallons need to be
transported. Each helicopter could take, at most, about
250 gallons per trip. Winds were howling, the deck
was rocking and you still have the problem of pump-
ing sticky goo out of the fuel tanks up to the deck to
put in lots of containers which have to be flown in
from somewhere else.
No silver bullet. No win. No way to implement a
solution that everyone agrees on. Yet, you can't just
do nothing and watch 400,000 gallons empty out and
cover 50-100 miles of shoreline. Reality is often a
harsh teacher, indeed.
That leaves us with the burning idea. A successful
burning would certainly minimize the amount of oil
that would contaminate the beaches. But it would
produce thick clouds of toxic smoke and paniculate
pollution. People with respiratory conditions would be
at risk. If the fire burned too hot, the vessel could
melt to some degree and immediately release the rest
of the bunker oil to the sea. Plus, there is the problem
of igniting the oil in the first place. The first attempt
failed because not enough heat was generated. So,
napalm time. Napalm will generate enough heat
initially and if enough oxygen could be made available
to the fuel tanks (possibly by puncturing the sides
with small torpedos) then there was half a chance of
achieving a controlled burn. Mix half a chance with
some hope and weigh that against the other alternative
and you quickly realize there's one and only one
option.
This is the message I was trying to impart to the
students, but was unsure if it was being received or
understood. Finally, after a moment of awkward
silence, one remarked, "So essentially, the least bad
alternative was chosen." "Bravo", I said to myself,
because after the smoke dissipates and the charred hull
is towed away and sunk and the incident fades into
memory, this student will still remember that environ-
mental decisions are difficult and usually require not
being afraid to implement the "least bad alternative."
The actual burn was not completely successful, but by
most accounts, it converted 75% of the on-board oil
into smoke. That meant 300,000 fewer gallons were
available to reach the beach. Do we declare victory
with a 75% solution? Of course not. But there are
never any 100% solutions or victors in environmental
problems. There are only victims and good decision-
making that ultimately minimizes the number of
victims. What else can you do?
There is more than enough blame to be spreadaround as the judicial system attempts to trackthe real "owner" of the New Carrissa. Yet in a
sense, we are all owners. We live in a world with 6
billion other people with an exponentially growing
population and hence an exponentially growing use of
resources. That means more cars on the road, more
greenhouse gas emissions, more dollars being created,
more trade required, more ships in the ocean. Events
like the New Carissa, the Torrey Canyon, and the
Exxon Valdez ultimately are nothing more than the
price of doing business.
Many weeks after the New Carissa incident it was
popular to second guess all the decisions. Self-pro-
continued on page 10
When the Beach is Clean, the Hard Work Begins
by Peter Walker, Assistant Professor of Environmental Studies and Geography, University of Oregon
A s the flames on the broken hulk of the NewCarissa continue to burn, it is natural thatmost of our attention so far has been directed
at the urgent and immediate problem of averting an
even greater environmental disaster. We have been
forced to make difficult choices about different options
for minimizing ecological damages. But an even more
difficult and important set of questions awaits us: how
to prevent similar events in the future. The wreck of
the New Carissa is not the first and will not be the last
threat from the international shipping industry to
Oregon's sensitive coastal areas. Once the immediate
threat of further ecological damage from the New
Carissa is under control, it
is imperative that the
public insist on improve-
ments to maritime rules to
provide greater environ-
mental protection.
The burning hulk of the
New Carissa, surrounded
by napalm- and grenade-
dropping helicopters and
crashing high surf, is an
action-packed drama that
has captured the attention
of the media and the
public. But this drama conceals an important mystery:
why was the New Carissa, heavy with toxic fuel, only
a few yards off the shore of a National Recreation
Area and a sensitive habitat for threatened species
during near-hurricane conditions? The media has paid
scant attention to the question of why the New Carissa
ran aground. In part, this is because we know so little.
On Thursday, February 18, the Coast Guard opened an
inquiry into the cause of the wreck, and we will prob-
ably have to wait for the results of that inquiry to say
for certain what happened. The best information so far
is that an inexperienced crew anchored the ship just off
the beach while waiting for a pilot ship to guide the
Photograph: Cleanup workers near vessel, bow, stern
and towline in background
2/26/99 USCG - Brandon Brewer
New Carissa into Coos Bay. When the crew realized
that the strong currents and surf threatened to push the
ship aground, the New Carissa's engines were too
weak to take the ship back out to sea.
If this information is accurate, it is clear that the wreck
of the New Carissa was entirely preventable. The
under-powered ship should never have been so close
to shore in such heavy weather. The captain should
never have set anchor so close to shore in high surf
and strong currents. Like most 'accidents', this was
not an act of God. It was an act of people in a hurry
acting under inadequate safety rules. In turn, the
inadequacy of rules for
operating ships near fragile
ecological areas reflects the
political power of important
industries. It is likely that
the Coast Guard will con-
clude that the captain and
crew of the New Carissa
were at fault. But it is our
own political system that
created the rules that allowed
this disaster to happen.
Ultimately, we, the public,
and our political leaders,
must take the blame.
S trengthening maritime rules will not be easy orcheap, and these efforts will be resisted bypowerful industries. The public will be asked
to make the familiar choice between environmental
protection and possible job losses in affected indus-
tries. But we must also consider the cost of doing
nothing. The environmental costs are well known:
another, possibly much larger, spill could devastate
fragile estuaries and coastal ecosystems and habitat for
endangered species, such as the last remaining 100 or
so Western snowy plovers in Oregon. But we should
also think about the economic costs of the status quo:
the wreck of the New Carissa threatened south-central
Oregon's $24-million-a-year dungeness crab industry,
as well as the livelihoods of the area's oyster farmers,
When the Beach is Clean continued on page 10
Responding to Environmental Accidents:
Regulating Others and Regulating Ourselves
by Ronald B. Mitchell, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon
The New Carissa, the Exxon Valdez, theChernobyl nuclear reactor, Love Canal. Wehear about large, high-visibility, dramatic
environmental accidents like these all too often. Such
incidents often serve as useful "wake-up calls" (as
Peter Walker suggests) for the need for regulations
that can help prevent similar accidents from occurring
in the future. People are rightly outraged at the appar-
ent lack of environmental concern in others - from
tanker captains to the responsible companies and
industries to the policy makers who should have
regulated those companies and industries. Most
environmentalists, and
even many who would not
consider themselves envi-
ronmentalists, respond with
a desire to find what Greg
Bothun, elsewhere in this
issue, calls a "silver bullet"
to solve the problem and
make sure it doesn't hap-
pen again. Often they
produce valuable efforts to
get the people and organi-
zations immediately re-
sponsible for the accident
to take actions to mitigate
as much damage as possible and to pay for such
damage as cannot be mitigated. In addition, we often
demand very specific rules that seek to constrain
responsible individuals, corporations, and govern-
ments to reduce the chance that such environmentally-
damaging behaviors happen again. When well thought
through, such efforts can help preserve the environ-
ment of our planet.
Y et, in most realms, the majority of the damagehumans do to the environment does not stemfrom the large, rare, high-visibility, dramatic
accidents that are likely to make the evening news.
Rather, the overwhelming majority of human harm to
Photograph: Vessel andAlsea Bay/Waldport
3/6/99 NOAA
the environment stems from the aggregate unintended
consequences of millions of small, intentional, every-
day acts. Accidental oil spills are responsible for only
a small fraction of the oil that enters the ocean each
year, dwarfed by the discharges from tanker operators
cleaning their tanks, pleasure boaters pumping their
bilges, and even car owners who fail to fix their
engines' oil leaks. If the New Carissa constitutes an
environmental "felony," then the vast bulk of ecologi-
cal "crime" consists of environmental "misdemean-
ors." Consider the collective burden on the environ-
ment that results from each of us engaging in the long
string of small, mundane,
and often daily acts, each
of which imposes some
small, sometimes almost
immeasurable additional





offenses that are the unin-
tended result of intentional
actions, and those that are
the unintended and even
undesired result of true
accidents. Water and air quality are damaged, forests
and wetlands are destroyed, and species are threatened
as much by the sum of the mundane and unintended
"misdemeanors" each of us commits every day as by
the more infamous "felonies" of others.
Does this mean we should not push for better regula-
tions and other policy actions when faced with envi-
ronmental tragedies like the New Carissa, the Exxon
Valdez, Chernobyl, or Love Canal? Of course not.
Identifying ways to induce large corporations to take
more responsibility for environmental protection and
to develop measures that will reduce the likelihood of
such accidents happening in the future should be a
crucial part of our efforts to protect the environment.
Responding to Environmental Accidents continued on page 11
The Role of Coastal Communities in Emergency Environmental
Decisions: The New Carissa as a Living Laboratory
for Environmental Justice
by Robert W. Collin, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon
The recent sinking of an ocean going vessel, theNew Carissa1, near sensitive ecosystems andresource dependent communities is indicative
of how we solve most environmental problems. First,
no one had a clear idea of exactly what chemicals
were emitted or discharged. The subsequent napalm
bombing of the stranded, leaking vessel by federal
agencies did not consider possible synergistic effects
with whatever was inside of this particular vessel.
Second, no one consid-
ered the human health
and ecological pathways
of exposure and risk of
exposure to these chemi-
cals,2 erring on the side
of making those harmed
or at risk of being
harmed prove their
losses before this is even
considered. And last,
the affected community
was not allowed to
engage in the solution,
or even participate in
information sharing at
critical stages of deci-
sion making.
The exclusion of communities in any type ofenvironmental decision is typical. Manyenvironmental decisions made by the Govern-
ment do have requirements for public participation,
however, there is often no requirement to notify
communities of the opportunities to participate. Many
people thus question the value of these forums in
terms of meaningful involvement. The end result is
that communities do not have much experience with
multi-stakeholder3, complex environmental decisions4.
Government and industry do not have this experience
Photograph: People on beach looking at ship
2/26/99 USCG - Brandon Brewer
either. When developing proactive policies or regulat-
ing industry, this lack of collaborative partnership
simply repeats the environmental decisions that got us
here. When the community is not considered as both a
source of information and part of the ecosystem, this
lack of partnership exacerbates environmental degra-
dation.
One reason for this exclusion is that communities are
thought to be ignorant
of science, or at least of
the science that would
be applicable to the






whether the decision is
to protect the environ-
ment and how, or




of the use of science is premised on political consider-
ations related to who is making the decision. The use
of science is very different in academia; in local, state,
and federal agencies; and in communities.7 The time,
political, and economic constraints of these three sets
of stakeholders create different types of forums for
environmental decisions.
A second issue is the practicality of the scientific
method when information is unknowable, incomplete,
and incomparable. While "science-bashing" may be
popular in some circles, it is not the tools and methods
of science that pose a problem in emergency environ-
mental decisions such as the immediate and complete
remediation of the ecosystem after the grounding of
8
the New Carissa. It is the incomplete reporting of
scientific conclusions. When information is incom-
plete, unknowable, and/or incomparable the scientific
conclusion is generally that one can neither confirm
nor deny any conclusions. This is often reported in the
press and is used by scientific expert witnesses to
"disprove" causality.8
The third major issue in emergency environmental
decisions is the length of time of scientific, on the
ground, investigations. This problem is compounded
by the lack of important environmental baseline
information. Environmental baseline information is
both static and dynamic, so that applicable baseline
information would include the types and rates of
change of major environmental activity, (i.e., tide
constriction, migration paths, public and private
development and/or remediation activities) Not know-
ing these rates of change in a particular ecosystem
severely hampers timely scientific intervention.
Therefore, in emergency environmental decisions
data and knowledge about the particular dynamics of
the ecosystem must come from somewhere else.
C oastal communities rest on the edge of land ina delicate and dynamic balance, creatingpockets of life renewing biodiversity and
people with a history and culture of natural resource
use9. The environmental trauma caused by the New
Carissa and subsequent environmental decisions
highlighted the exclusion of the affected communities.
Community members were not even allowed to volun-
teer to clean the oil tarnished beaches of their home.
While the environmental outreach to birds and some
sea mammals has been well documented, nothing has
been discussed in terms of public health. Community
residents first spotted the New Carissa floundering
close to shore, and later observed the failure of the
New Carissa to lower the anchor after it reported
having done so. If the real reason communities are
excluded from environmental decisions is to hide
sordid truths about environmental and ecosystem
trauma because of legal liability and cost, then this
hiding will be short-lived. Unfortunately it will have a
very high impact on the environment; especially as
emissions, discharges, and pollutants accumulate. We,
as humans, are not immune from this dynamic. The
communities that have been most impacted and most
excluded from environmental decisions are increas-
ingly demanding that they speak for themselves.10 This
is a fundamental concept in the Environmental Justice
Movement and indicative of rising civic environmen-
talism.
There will be other incidents like the NewCarissa. These incidents require us to reactquickly to a set of unknown and potentially
dangerous circumstances. These incidents must be
analytically revisited in a way that includes the com-
munity. How would have the city of Newport handled
this? Would the damage have been less? What was the
range of interventions inclusive of community? What
we can do now is to examine the reasons why we lack
understanding of our impacts upon the ecosystem and
each other. This will require multi-stakeholder forums,
inclusionary dialogues, and much more time for
decision making. If our goal is sustainability then new
forums, dialogues, and time will be even more impor-
tant.
'Some federal agency documents regarding this incident are available at http://
161.55.32.17:591/carissa/uc_doc6.htm. There is little mention of the human community.
2See, National Research Council: Committee on Risk Characterization,
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY,
Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg, eds. (National Academy Press, Washington,
D.C.)(1996).
3The author was part of a Federal Advisory Committee that developed a multi-
stakeholder, multimedia, community involved, sector based (Printing) permitting project. The
Request for Proposals for state agencies can be accessed by www.access.gpo.gov/sudocs/
aces/aces 140.html, then look for "notices", then 4/21/99, for search term type in environmen-
tal protection agency.
4See, Architects/Designers/Planners for Social Responsibility, " Community
Revitalization: Uncommon Partners in Renewal" issue NEW VILLAGE: BUILDING
SUSTAINABLE CULTURES. (1999).
5See, Michael K. Heiman, "Science by the People: Grassroots Environmental
Monitoring and the Debate Over Scientific Expertise" Journal of Planning, Education, and
Research 291(Summer 1997).
6See, e.g., John Wargo, OUR CHILDREN'S TOXIC LEGACY: HOW
SCIENCE AND LAW FAIL TO PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES (Yale University
Press, New Haven and London)(1996).
7See, Institute of Medicine, TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
Research, Education, and Policy Needs, (National Academy Press, Washington, D.C.)
(1999)(www.nap.edu).
'See, National Safety Center - Environmental Health Center, CHEMICALS,
THE PRESS, AND THE PUBLIC: A JOURNALIST'S GUIDE TO REPORTING ON
CHEMICALS IN THE COMMUNITY, 1050 17th Street, N.W. Suite 770, Washington, DC.
20036.
'As communities seek to speak for themselves in new multistakeholder
environmental decision making forums, historical and cultural values are expressed. These
images can differ greatly, and understanding them can help decrease acrimony in the
discourse. For example, gender issues may shape environmental perspective, and in
matriarchially-led groups this is important to understand. See e.g., Louise H. Westling, THE
GREEN BREAST OF THE NEW WORLD:LANDSCAPE, GENDER, AND AMERICAN
FICTION (University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA)(1996).
'"See, Collin & Collin, "Urban Environmentalist!! and Race" in URBAN
PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS,
June Manning Thomas & Marsha Ritzdof Eds. (Sage Publications Thousand Oaks,
CA)(1997).
Chronology continued from page 3
lery fire from a Navy destroyer, the oil-laden New
Carissa takes a torpedo from a nuclear-powered
submarine before dropping two miles to the ocean
floor.
Totals: Approximately 70,000 gallons of oil spilled.
More than 200 dead birds recovered after the spill,
including: 2 Snowy Plovers and 24 marbled murrelets
(endangered species). Tests underway to determine
how many killed by oil. Forty percent of the endan-
gered Snowy Plover bird population (100 total in
Oregon) found with traces of oil or tar. Nearly $22
million spent on salvage and cleanup to date.
Flames of New Carissa continued from page 4
claimed experts spontaneously appeared demonstrat-
ing once again the wisdom of hindsight. Such is the
legacy of environmental catastrophe - post-event
analysis. Who will do that when the ultimate environ-
mental catastrophe eliminates humans? When will we
realize that statistical accidents do occur, but they are
motivated in the first place by consumption and this is
directly scalable. If we want to have 10% fewer oil
spills then each individual needs to consume 10% less
oil. Simple as that. As long as we continue to engage
in conspicuous consumption without accountability we
will get exactly what we paid for.
Photograph: Detonation ofplasic explosives
3/11/99 Seattle Times
When the Beach is Clean continued from page 6
crabbers, and fishermen, not to mention the multi-
million-dollar tourist industry. A major spill could
devastate these important industries and the liveli-
hoods of the thousands of people who depend on them.
In strengthening maritime rules, we will be protecting
these human communities as well as the local ecology.
Of course, not all industries are created equal. The
timber industry, which depends heavily on interna-
tional shipping, has a special place in Oregon politics.
Yet several Oregon political leaders have already
taken a stand in favor of revised maritime rules. U.S.
Representative Peter DeFazio has announced that he
plans to file a bill to make some foreign-flagged ships
wait at international borders 12 miles out to sea until
they receive a U.S. pilot or are found com-
petent to enter U.S. waters. DeFazio has
also called for changes in maritime laws to
improve the quality of ships' crews and give
the U.S. more power to regulate the opera-
tions of foreign ships in our waters. Gover-
nor Kitzhaber has indicated that he will
probably appoint a task force to make
recommendations for new rules to prevent
similar occurrences in the future.
In a way, perhaps we were lucky withthe New Carissa: this experience mayserve as an important wake-up call
before a bigger disaster occurs. It appears at
the moment that the ecological damages
from this wreck, while substantial, may be
relatively limited. This should not lull us into com-
placency: next time, we may not be so lucky. When
the last oil globules are scraped off the beaches of
Coos Bay, the even more difficult job of revising
maritime rules against the interests of powerful
industries will begin. Much to their credit, Represen-
tative DeFazio and Governor Kitzhaber have stated
their intention to take on this task. But politicians
have been known, on occasion, to take bold positions
following disasters only to give in to industry pressure
as the heat of public outrage dissipates with time. It
will be up to all of us to keep the heat on.
10
Responding to Environmental Accidents continued from page 7
Yet, it can only be a part of that effort.
A ccidents like the New Carissa understandablydo make us more attentive to the environmen-tal carelessness of others and lead us to seek
out ways to make them be more careful in the future.
But, in addition, such accidents provide an opportunity
to become more attentive to our own, more mundane,
environmental carelessness and can lead us to seek out
ways that we as individuals can "walk more softly" on
the earth. If we use such accidents to remind us of how
we each contribute to the environmental devastation
we see around us, it can help motivate us to identify
and take the immediate and personal actions that will





takes advantage of our
greater control over








chips for large multi-
national corporations.
To get the owners of ships like the New Carissa to be
more careful in the future requires grassroots organiz-
ing and lobbying to influence members of Congress to
draft and vote for bills and to support international
treaties that then must lead to the threat of penalties (or
offers of assistance) that will lead to safer operations
in the future. The number of links in this policy chain
at a minimum reduce, and sometimes eliminate, our
chances for success.
But, we can almost always control our own actions.
The chance of environmental progress may be far
greater if each of us uses these accidents to remind and
recommit ourselves to fix the oil leak in our car today,
to drive slower to conserve gas, to take a bike rather
than drive the car, to turn out the lights as we leave a
room, to put on a sweater rather than turn up the heat,
to turn off the water when we shave and brush our
teeth, to take a shorter shower, to remember our mug
when buying coffee, to buy less coffee. Our habits and
thoughtlessness make even such small changes diffi-
cult to implement. And the fact that they are so small,
especially when
compared to an event
like the New Carissa,
makes it difficult to
find any motivation
to make such









tection that we face
collectively.
B y using major accidents as prompts not only tocriticize and address the environmentally-damaging behavior of others, but to re-exam-
ine the environmental impacts of our own lives and re-
commit ourselves to reducing those impacts, we may
be able to find a far larger silver lining in the clouds
that such accidents bring.
Photograph: Rounds fired by Navy Destroyer
3/11/99 Seattle Times
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UO Study on Success of " GreenM Investing Wins National Prize
The Social Investment Forum, a national non-profit organization that promotes environmen-tally friendly investing, has awarded its 1998
Moskowitz Prize for outstanding research to a Univer-
sity of Oregon study.
The study by UO management professor Michael
Russo and UO graduate student Michael Fouts exam-
ines how a group of Fortune 500 companies were able
to increase profits by embracing 'green' environmental
strategies.
Their work was published in the "Academy of Man-
agement Journal" after a rigorous peer review process.
"It pays to be green," says Russo. "Greener companies
tend to promote innovation, conserve valuable re-
sources in their production systems and enhance their
reputation for both prospective employees and poten-
tial customers. They go beyond the minimum required
by law, and their shareholders reap the rewards."
R usso and Fouts examined the economic andenvironmental performance of 243 companiesover a two-year period. Their research found
that companies with superior environmental perfor-
mance had higher returns on investment compared to
their competitors—even after accounting for sales
growth and market position.
"We teach our students that ethical and socially con-
scious behavior is profitable in the long run. This
research confirms that premise," says Dale Morse,
dean of the UO Charles H. Lundquist College of
Business.
"Some mistaken financial 'experts' assume that envi-
ronmentally responsible practices represent costs
without benefits," says Alisa Gravitz, Social Invest-
ment Forum vice president. "Executives and stock-
holders take note—when you actually crunch the
numbers, it turns out that good environmental citizen-
ship is great for the bottom line."
The Moskowitz Prize, named for renownedfinancial analyst Milton Moskowitz, isawarded annually by a three-judge panel.
Moskowitz, along with co-author Robert Levering,
wrote the 1984 best seller "The 100 Best Companies
to Work For in America."
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